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1 Executive Summary 
The Center for Trustworthy Scientific Cyberinfrastructure (CTSC) engages with NSF-funded 
projects to address their cybersecurity challenges. This document presents the results of one 
such engagement with the Pegasus project, a workflow management system for computational 
science. Pegasus workflows typically operate across distributed resources and sometimes need 
to stage data files between compute resources to or from storage resources. When such 
staging requires secure shell (SSH), Pegasus’ current practice is to send a private key with the 
workflow to perform a secure copy. The goal of this engagement was to examine this practice 
and recommend any possible improvements from the perspective of cybersecurity. We provide 
three recommendations to the Pegasus team to improve current practice: (1) If system 
administrators are willing, have them deploy a mechanism that supports security delegation, 
such as Kerberos or GSI; (2) provide assistance to users in using SSH’s ability to impose 
restrictions in the authorized_keys file to limit the privileges of SSH keys used for workflows; 
and (3) utilize ssh-agent to minimize exposure of SSH credentials in the workflow by avoiding 
writing those credentials to the filesystem. We also describe alternatives we considered but do 
not recommend. 
 
2 Background and Problem Statement 
Pegasus [1] is a workflow management system (WMS) for scientific workflows. A workflow will, 
typically, operate across distributed compute and storage resources. Pegasus uses the 
HTCondor [2] high throughput computing software system for its distributed computing needs, 
scheduling jobs to run on available compute resources. Pegasus supports a variety of data 
transfer protocols and associated credential types for authentication: X.509 grid proxies, 
Amazon AWS S3 keys, iRods password, and SSH keys.  
 
The goal of the Pegasus-CTSC Engagement was to examine a particular use case of the 
Pegasus WMS where data needs to be copied to or from the workflow to a storage system via 
secure shell (SSH) and determine what recommendations could be made to improve the current 
practice from the perspective of cybersecurity. 
 
In our representative use case, shown in Figure 1, a user submits a workflow from a Submit 
Host (SH) to one or more worker nodes (WNs) which need to copy data to or from a remote 
Staging Site (SS). In this use case the WNs and SS do not share a filesystem, but instead 
access it over the SSH protocol. The SS may be copying data to or from other sites, but this is 
unimportant for our use case, and this copying is done via mechanisms other than Pegasus. 
The current practice in Pegasus is to have the user supply his or her SSH credential (private 
key), which Pegasus includes with the workflow so that it can be used by a WN to perform a 
secure copy via SSH (scp). Users are encouraged to create a separate SSH credential to be 
used only by Pegasus to mitigate any misuse of that credential. 
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Figure 1. Use case: non-shared file system; scp to stage data. Solid arrows represent job 
submission by workflow; dashed arrows represent data movement. 
3 Relevant Technologies 
In researching alternatives to the current practice, we discovered or were already cognizant of a 
number of technologies relevant to Pegasus’ usage of secure shell (SSH) [3] and its secure 
copy (scp).  
We primarily considered SSH using public key authentication, in which a public-private 
cryptographic key pair is used to authenticate the client. On the server site, an 
authorized_keys file is used to limit which keys can access an account and restrict that 
access to certain commands1.  
 
Typically SSH private keys are encrypted on disk with a passphrase for security; this can create 
the need for repeated passphrase entry by and be onerous for users. To ease repeated use, 
ssh-agent2, is a program that can decrypt a SSH private key once and then hold it in memory, 
allowing its repeated use while providing a more secure alternative to having no encryption. 
 
An SSH-related command in the HTCondor system is called condor_ssh_to_job3. This 
command lets a user create an SSH session to a running job. We note it does not work for 
“standard universe” jobs. Section 7, Other Use Cases, discusses condor_ssh_to_job in more 
detail. 
                                               
1
 refer to the “AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT” section of the sshd man page, 
http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=sshd 
2
 http://www.openbsd.org/cgi-bin/man.cgi?query=ssh-agent&sektion=1  
3
 http://research.cs.wisc.edu/htcondor/manual/current/condor_ssh_to_job.html  
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4 Security Criteria 
Our first step was to determine our criteria from a cybersecurity perspective in judging 
alternatives to enabling authentication from the Worker Node to the Staging Site. We identified 
the following: 
 
1. Minimize the exposure of any passwords or SSH private keys. 
a. Avoid transmitting such authentication material over the network entirely. 
Transmitting such authentication material is frowned upon, making any scheme 
using it difficult to socialize, because it exposes the material to potential 
interception both during transition and on other computers to which it is 
transmitted. 
b. If such authentication material is transmitted, reduce that exposure by, whenever 
possible, encrypting it and avoiding storing it on filesystems. 
2. Minimize the privileges granted to any authentication passwords or keys provided to the 
workflow. In addition to reducing the exposure, and hence chance of misuse of 
authentication material, seek to reduce the impact of that misuse by reducing the 
privileges associated with that material. 
3. Maximize ease-of-use for both the workflow initiator and the administrators of the Worker 
Node and Staging Site. 
4. Minimize complexity of the resulting system, to maximize ease of implementation, 
deployment and explanation.   
 
We note these criteria represent a tension: increasing security, as indicated by criteria 1 and 2, 
means more effort; however, criteria 3 and 4 are about minimizing effort for the different parties 
involved. Hence our evaluation of different alternatives had much to do with balancing the 
tradeoff of more security versus the added effort, and who would be burdened by that additional 
effort. 
 
5 Recommendations 
In this section we provide our recommendations to the Pegasus team with regards to their 
current practice. Alternative approaches that we considered, but did not choose to recommend, 
are included in the subsequent section. 
 
As previously described, the Pegasus WMS currently directs its users to include an SSH 
credential with the workflow to handle the use case in question. This credential is then used by 
a Worker Node to authenticate to a Staging Site. In the Pegasus reference manual, it is 
recommended that a user create SSH credentials distinct from credentials used for other 
activities, in order to minimize the privileges of those credentials. 
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Recommendation #1: Have system administrators deploy an authentication mechanism that 
supports delegation. Ideally one would utilize one of the alternatives to SSH, namely Kerberos 
[4] and Grid Security Infrastructure (GSI) [5], which support delegation. These systems would 
allow a user to securely transmit a temporary token (ticket in the case of Kerberos, proxy 
certificate in the case of GSI) from the Submit Host to the Worker Node(s) which would allow 
access to the Staging Site. However, these alternatives must be installed and supported by the 
system administrator of the Worker Nodes and Staging Site and we understand there will be 
administrators who choose not to do so, hence we continued exploring other options. 
 
Recommendation #2: Restrict any SSH credentials use for the workflow using SSH’s 
authorized_keys file. Augmenting the Pegasus’ team current recommendation of creating 
temporary, workflow-specific SSH credentials, we recommend the Pegasus team provide 
guidance (or software tools) to help users create restrictions for the authorized_keys file on the 
Staging Site to minimize the privileges of SSH credentials created for Pegasus workflows. As 
we described previously in Section 3, Relevant Technologies, SSH credentials must be 
registered into an authorized_keys file to be granted access; in this case, that file would be on 
the Staging Site. SSH allows the authorized_keys to contain additional restrictions, e.g. allowing 
a credential to be restricted to specific subdirectories. These restrictions are described in more 
detail in Appendix A.  
 
Recommendation #3: Use ssh-agent to avoid storing SSH credential on the Worker Node 
filesystem. Currently SSH credentials are stored on the filesystem of the Worker Node. By 
instead storing the SSH credential in ssh-agent, this storage on the filesystem could be avoided, 
providing some additional security, e.g. if the disk space used by a job was failed to be cleaned 
up, the SSH credential would not persist there. We do note this would require some 
development by the Pegasus team and might require support from the underlying HTCondor 
system to completely avoid writing the credential to disk. Since the Pegasus team has indicated 
they do not wish to pursue this option, we have not explored all the details of this 
recommendation. 
 
6 Other Alternatives Explored 
In this section we discuss other alternative approaches we explored for the given use case, but 
do not put forward as recommended. 
 
Alternative 1: Transmitting the User’s long-term SSH keys with the workflow.  
● Pros: Easy, no additional work required. 
● Cons: User’s long-term credentials are exposed and those credentials have full 
privileges of the user on Staging Site and any other service to which the user has 
access. 
● Assessment: High ease of use, but low security. Broader exposure of the user’s long-
term credentials will be undesirable to both the administrators of the services and a large 
subset of the user community. 
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Alternative 2: Create a new set of SSH credentials for each instantiation of a workflow. The 
user, or more likely the Pegasus software, generates a new set of SSH credentials for each 
workflow submission, grants them privileges on the SS and, after the workflow completes, 
cleans up those privileges. 
 
● Pros: Credentials are both limited in privileges and reduced in exposure. By automating 
the process of creating SSH keys, you remove any uncertainty regarding whether the 
user has created, as recommend, a separate set of credentials for running the workflow. 
● Cons: Highly complex. Automatic modification of authorized_keys file may be fragile. 
Workflows that fail could start “cluttering” up the authorized_keys file on the SS. 
Benefit over workflow-specific credentials is unclear. 
● Assessment: Higher security but low ease of use. Overly complicated and fragile. Would 
need significant testing. Unlikely that benefits outweigh costs. 
 
Alternative 3: Avoid storing the SSH credential on the Worker Node filesystem by storing it in an 
environment variable. Similar to our Recommendation #3 in the previous section, this alternative 
seeks to avoid writing the SSH credential to the file system on the Worker Node, the difference 
is that the credential is instead stored in an environment variable and then retrieved by Pegasus 
when needed. 
 
● Pros: Moderate ease of use; may provide some additional security. 
● Cons: Would require additional development by the Pegasus team. The fatal flaw is that 
environment variables and their values are not private on all operating system and can 
be exposed, e.g., via the terminal command “ps auxe” on OSX. 
● Assessment: Effort put on Pegasus development team. The public nature of 
environment variables renders the benefits of this approach too unreliable. 
 
Alternative 4: Provide credentials to Worker Node via ssh-agent forwarding. As previously 
described in Section 3, ssh-agent allows for repeated authentication using SSH credentials. 
SSH supports remote access to an ssh-agent over a SSH connection using a technique called 
forwarding. In theory, an SSH connection from the Submit Host to a Worker Node could be used 
via forwarding to allow the use of an ssh-agent running on the Submit Host to allow Worker 
Nodes to authenticate to the Staging Site. There are several challenges with this approach: 
1. Forwarding requires an active, open SSH connection from the Submit Host to the 
Worker Node. This means the Submit Host must be available on the network (it 
cannot be a laptop that is suspended and put into a backpack) and there must be 
network connectivity between the Submit Host and the Worker Node (firewalls can 
cause issues here). 
2. Establishing the SSH connection to do the forwarding is tricky. Having the Worker 
Node connect back to the Submit Host means the Worker Node needs credentials, 
which in effect is the problem the use case is trying to solve. Having the Submit Host 
connect to the Worker Node means the job on the Worker Node must start a SSH 
daemon and Pegasus running on the Submit Host must somehow know when that 
daemon is started, which could be a challenge if the workflow must wait in a job 
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queue for an indeterminate length of time. condor_ssh_to_job, described in Section 
3, could be of help here, removing the need for the workflow to start a SSH daemon. 
We exchanged emails with the HTCondor developers, who indicated this might be 
possible, but we have not experimentally determined if condor_ssh_to_job supports 
forwarding of an ssh-agent. 
3. If a workflow spans many Worker Nodes, there could be scaling issues with the 
Submit Host having to maintain a large number of SSH connections. 
 
● Pros: Would avoid credentials having to be transferred to Worker Node altogether. Use 
of condor_ssh_to_job might simplify implementation. 
● Cons: Would require additional development by the Pegasus team. condor_ssh_to_job 
works only for vanilla, vm, java, local, and parallel universe jobs (not standard universe 
jobs). Fragility is a concern considering the added demands for stable networking and 
handling a large number of Worker Nodes. 
● Assessment: Effort put on Pegasus development team. A complicated approach that 
would need prototyping and testing to assess in practice. 
 
Alternative 5: Use condor_ssh_to_job to deliver an SSH credential to a Worker Node once the 
workflow is running. Instead of including the SSH credential with the workflow description, wait 
for process(es) to be instantiated on the Worker Nodes and then deliver SSH credentials to 
them using condor_ssh_to_job. 
 
● Pros: Reduces the exposure of the SSH credentials by not including them in the 
workflow description. 
● Cons: Would require additional development by the Pegasus team. Has the challenge 
that the Submit Host needs to know when and where jobs are running. 
● Assessment: Effort put on Pegasus development team. A complicated approach that 
would need prototyping and testing to assess in practice. 
 
Alternative 6: Have system administrators deploy SSH trusted host configuration between the 
Staging Site and the Worker Nodes. SSH supports the ability for a system administrator to 
configure one host to trust another, that is, allow any user on another host to access their 
account of the same name on the local host without authentication materials. If the administrator 
of the Staging Service configured the SSH daemon on that system to trust the Worker Nodes, 
this could allow Pegasus jobs running on those systems to access the Staging Service without 
needing an SSH credential. 
 
● Pros: Makes things easy for the user and Pegasus team. No SSH credentials would 
have to be exposed. 
● Cons: Requires Staging Site to highly trust the Worker Nodes and requires alignment of 
account names between those systems. 
● Assessment: Effort put on system administrators. Due to the cons, this is an approach 
that is unlikely to be readily adopted by anyone who has not already implemented it. 
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7 Other Use Cases 
In addition to the main use case discussed in this document - i.e., using a traditional Staging 
Site with SSH authentication - we briefly explored other similar use cases for this engagement. 
 
Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) 
While not the primary focus of this engagement, we explored data staging using Amazon S3, its 
credentials mechanism and access controls. The interface to S3 is handled by the Python script, 
pegasus-s34, using the boto5 Python module. Although we have not completely explored this 
space, it seems possible to use the boto.s3.bucket.set_policy function to 
programmatically limit access to buckets (containers for files). Appendix B contains more 
details. It seems that S3 credentials are analogous to SSH keys, in that S3 provides an “access 
key” (~ SSH public key) and a “secret access key” (~ SSH private key). Therefore, some of the 
recommendations that we made for SSH keys (e.g., creating/maintaining temporary, workflow-
specific keys) also apply to S3 keys. 
 
Pegasus as a Service 
The idea of “Pegasus as a service” with access via a hosted interface is a natural evolution for 
the Pegasus WMS and was discussed in a meeting with Pegasus and CTSC team members. 
Two interfaces are currently being considered - via a web browser and via REST6. The service 
model involves different security approaches from those we have discussed thus far. One 
widely used approach is OAuth7. Since Globus Online currently uses OAuth (for MyProxy)8 and 
Globus Online will likely be a CTSC engagement, we should have more to say about this in the 
near future. (OAuth is also used by Science Gateways.9) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
4
 https://github.com/pegasus-isi/pegasus/blob/master/bin/pegasus-s3 
5
 http://docs.pythonboto.org/en/latest/ 
6
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Representational_state_transfer 
7
 http://oauth.net/ 
8
 https://www.globusonline.org/news/announcement/2011/11/15/myproxy-oauth/ 
9
 http://www.sciencegatewaysecurity.org/oauth-for-myproxy 
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Appendix A: ssh authorized_keys restrictions 
We simulate the Pegasus use case of copying files from a Worker Node (WN, “gw86” below) to 
a Staging Site (SS, “gw57” below) via ssh/scp with restrictions imposed via the SSH 
authorized_keys file. 
 
authorized_keys/command 
To begin, generate Pegasus-specific SSH keys on a Submit Host: 
[heiland@SubmitHost]$ ssh-keygen -f ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pegasus 
<no passphrase> 
 
This generates the following private and public keys: 
-rw-------. 1 heiland heiland 1675 Mar 19 16:19 id_rsa.pegasus 
-rw-r--r--. 1 heiland heiland 407 Mar 19 16:19 id_rsa.pegasus.pub 
 
 
On the Staging Site, in your .ssh subdirectory, create an “authorized_keys” file that contains the 
“command” keyword pointing to a wrapper shell script (or Python script), followed by the 
Pegasus-specific public key generated above: 
 
[heiland@gw57 .ssh]$ more authorized_keys 
# invoke a shell script for Pegasus-specific SSH public key 
command="~/.ssh/ssh-wrapper.sh" <Pegasus-specific-public-key> 
 
 
Create a wrapper shell script which will only allow a “scp” command (in association with the 
Pegasus-specific key): 
 
[heiland@gw57 .ssh]$ more ssh-wrapper.sh 
#!/bin/bash 
# ssh-wrapper.sh 
 
case $SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND in 
 'scp'*) 
   $SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND 
   ;; 
 *) 
   echo "Invalid command" 
   ;; 
esac 
 
NOTE: only a single command is allowed for each block of the “case” statement. The scp 
command that you want to allow is conveniently stored in the SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND 
environment variable. 
 
Set appropriate permissions on the Staging Site’s .ssh subdir and files contained therein: 
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[heiland@gw57 .ssh]$ cd ~ 
[heiland@gw57 ~]$ chmod -R 700 .ssh  # from home dir 
 
→ 
-rwx------. 1 heiland heiland 943 Mar 20 11:30 authorized_keys 
-rwx------. 1 heiland heiland 206 Mar 20 10:28 ssh-wrapper.sh 
 
 
Simulate a scp from WN to SS: 
[heiland@gw86 .ssh]$ scp -q -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pegasus /home/heiland/foo.txt 
heiland@gw57.iu.xsede.org:/home/heiland 
 
On an actual WN, the private key would be sent in the workflow, copied to disk somewhere, and 
then that path specified, e.g.: 
[WN]$ scp -q -i /tmp/fred/id_rsa.pegasus /home/heiland/foo.txt 
heiland@gw57.iu.xsede.org:/home/heiland 
 
Rf. “scp” function in the “pegasus-transfer” Python script for additional arguments to scp: 
https://github.com/pegasus-isi/pegasus/blob/master/bin/pegasus-transfer 
 
Verify file is copied: 
[heiland@gw57 .ssh]$ ls -l .. 
-rw-rw-r--. 1 heiland heiland 4 Mar 20 09:53 foo.txt 
 
 
Note that trying to issue a command other than “scp” will fail, e.g. trying to do a “ls”: 
 
[heiland@gw86 .ssh]$ ssh -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pegasus heiland@gw57.iu.xsede.org 
ls 
Invalid command 
 
 
Verify that you can still ssh to the remote machine (using personal SSH keys, not Pegasus-
specific): 
[heiland@gw86 .ssh]$ ssh heiland@gw57.iu.xsede.org 
heiland@gw57.iu.xsede.org's password: 
Last login: Tue Mar 19 16:13:01 2013 from gw86.iu.xsede.org 
[heiland@gw57 ~]$ 
 
To avoid having to type your password, append your (personal) public key to the end of the 
SS’s ~/.ssh/authorized_keys: 
→ 
[heiland@gw57 .ssh]$ more ~/.ssh/authorized_keys 
command="~/.ssh/ssh-wrapper.sh" ssh-rsa 
AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEArQ0pCM+RCqJvS2sItmiQp5TWaYaGxN9GrCEMi2 
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GN2MENQDmReR/jGL2V9+yTgVvQjOPfUEF8ot2RpiiesALEIPz1JM2Pp4wfGKHOdkMOkSujWA/slLr
MTcHJqvjGAs24JeUOt+3CHI7Hf3hCI 
yDcNP0EV3OIfLP04uMGWbsMUj7RCUrDdAuoRB+gQ64Wwb/lnADVS82YujM2U23YMkHFjexBsXVT0I
D7oR0K7PdsZZa/+oCshglNJddsqqTy 
BQ6jtejnhGoqpi1/abPk74lxNrVXCh3SfKouwMVxJ1I5erHsp4Znj+VKCmYZmnTfsxxUqd8YHBRLq
a4vXAtGWuSZ3w== heiland@gw86.iu.xsede.org 
ssh-rsa 
AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAABIwAAAQEAxSxLqeSkpIy7ttj7hg1WQ/yW4OxvhpCxkj+kX3EbDJ3LnSSF/
pPyrpQHF8wQMn9Kk66FWg 
PbCA+m/eJpo/XsWoEceMyqq8105OlCd/w72a02PH6sxWwgHAHyBrcJ2eMxQEY7convNPVS1vbHspr
7BolGRDufzohzbdtV9MIpZcWQIOd3J 
m5e0fm5Q1xbrEJOVGSA/LRFANqWClgZG/qqXG1wvvOTmY5FJfnGn7G8128sjfgs3KxEJVEVx8qFrk
bX3nuHDZzv571W0dqAHisysVdq1Enb 
pfmr9P/lHNYvmwwdLubujzsPiur6oIxdWD6fHmfJXsPpE+ldVMUUyzfCJw== 
heiland@gw86.iu.xsede.org 
 
 
Restrict access to subdirectory 
The following version of ssh-wrapper.sh will go further than the version above by restricting 
commands to “scp”, preventing an “upward” directory path (“..”), and restricting access to one 
specified subdirectory (plus, keeping a log file): 
 
#!/bin/sh 
 
cmd="$SSH_ORIGINAL_COMMAND" 
echo "`date` ($SSH_CLIENT): $cmd" >> ssh-command-log # log all commands 
 
# check that command doesn't involve upwards path components in 
# any location to prevent, for instance, scp -t <path>/../ 
echo "$cmd" | fgrep '..' >/dev/null && echo "Forbidden command due to '..': 
$cmd" && exit 
 
case "$cmd" in 
# scp\ *) exec $cmd ;; 
 scp\ *-t\ /home/heiland/valid_subdir) exec $cmd ;; 
 scp\ *-t\ /home/heiland/valid_subdir/*) exec $cmd ;; 
 *) echo "Forbidden command: $cmd" ;; 
esac 
 
This will succeed: 
[heiland@gw86 .ssh]$ scp -q -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pegasus /home/heiland/foo.txt 
heiland@gw57.iu.xsede.org:/home/heiland/valid_subdir 
 
and this will too: 
[heiland@gw86 .ssh]$ scp -q -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pegasus /home/heiland/foo.txt 
heiland@gw57.iu.xsede.org:/home/heiland/valid_subdir/bar.txt 
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However, this will not succeed as it lacks the “/valid_subdir”: 
[heiland@gw86 .ssh]$ scp -q -i ~/.ssh/id_rsa.pegasus /home/heiland/foo.txt 
heiland@gw57.iu.xsede.org:/home/heiland 
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Appendix B: Amazon AWS Security 
We have excerpted sections from two documents on AWS security, an overview whitepaper10 
and another on credentials11, that appear relevant to this engagement. In addition, we provide a 
simple example using the boto Python client to AWS that is used by Pegasus to access S3 
resources. 
 
Glossary 
Credentials: Items that a user or process must have in order to confirm to AWS services during 
the authentication process that they are authorized to access the service. AWS credentials 
include the Access Key ID and Secret Access Key as well as X.509 certificates and multi-factor 
tokens. 
 
Access Key ID: A string that AWS distributes in order to uniquely identify each AWS user; it is 
an alphanumeric token associated with your Secret Access Key. 
 
Secret Access Key: A key that AWS assigns to you when you sign up for an AWS Account. To 
make API calls or to work with the command line interface, each AWS user needs the Secret 
Access Key and Access Key ID. The user signs each request with the Secret Access Key and 
includes the Access Key ID in the request. To ensure the security of your AWS 
account, the Secret Access Key is accessible only during key and user creation. You must save 
the key (for example, in a text file that you store securely) if you want to be able to access it 
again. 
 
X.509: In cryptography, X.509 is a standard for a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) for single sign-
on and Privilege Management Infrastructure (PMI). X.509 specifies standard formats for public 
key certificates, certificate revocation lists, attribute certificates, and a certification path 
validation algorithm. Some AWS products use X.509 certificates instead of a Secret Access Key 
for access to certain interfaces. For example, Amazon EC2 uses a Secret Access Key for 
access to its Query interface, but it uses a signing certificate for access to its SOAP interface 
and command line tool interface. 
 
Amazon Simple Storage Service (S3) Security 
Amazon S3 allows you to upload and retrieve data at any time, from anywhere on the web. 
Amazon S3 stores data as objects within buckets. An object can be any kind of file: a text file, a 
photo, a video, etc. When you add a file to Amazon S3, you have the option of including 
metadata with the file and setting permissions to control access to the file. For each bucket, you 
can control access to the bucket (who can create, delete, and list objects in the bucket), view 
access logs for the bucket and its objects, and choose the geographical region where Amazon 
S3 will store the bucket and its contents. 
 
                                               
10
 http://awsmedia.s3.amazonaws.com/pdf/AWS_Security_Whitepaper.pdf 
11
 http://docs.aws.amazon.com/AWSSecurityCredentials/1.0/AboutAWSCredentials.html#QuickStart 
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Data Access 
Access to data stored in Amazon S3 is restricted by default; only bucket and object owners 
have access to the Amazon S3 resources they create (note that a bucket/object owner is the 
AWS Account owner, not the user who created the bucket/object). There are multiple ways to 
control access to buckets and objects: 
 
○ Identity and Access Management (IAM) Policies. AWS IAM enables 
organizations with many employees to create and manage multiple users under a 
single AWS Account. IAM policies are attached to the users, enabling centralized 
control of permissions for users under your AWS Account. With IAM policies, you 
can only grant users within your own AWS account permission to access your 
Amazon S3 resources. 
○ Access Control Lists (ACLs). Within Amazon S3, you can use ACLs to give 
read or write access on buckets or objects to groups of users. With ACLs, you 
can only grant other AWS accounts (not specific users) access to your Amazon 
S3 resources. 
○ Bucket Policies. Bucket policies in Amazon S3 can be used to add or deny 
permissions across some or all of the objects within a single bucket. Policies can 
be attached to users, groups, or Amazon S3 buckets, enabling centralized 
management of permissions. With bucket policies, you can grant users within 
your AWS Account or other AWS Accounts access to your S3 resources. 
 
Type of Access Control  AWS Account-Level Control?  User-Level Control? 
IAM Policies     No     Yes 
ACLs      Yes     No 
Bucket Policies    Yes     Yes 
 
You can further restrict access to specific resources based on certain conditions. For 
example, you can restrict access based on request time (Date Condition), whether the 
request was sent using SSL (Boolean Conditions), a requester’s IP address (IP Address 
Condition), or based on the requester's client application (String Conditions). 
 
boto: Python S3 client 
Boto12 is a Python client to AWS that is used by Pegasus (rf. pegasus-s313 and pegasus-
transfer
14) to interface with AWS S3. 
 
To reproduce the following Python script (after installing boto), it is necessary to have set the 
following environment variables to contain the associated key strings: AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID 
and AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY 
 
                                               
12
 http://docs.pythonboto.org/en/latest/, https://github.com/boto/boto 
13
 https://github.com/pegasus-isi/pegasus/blob/master/bin/pegasus-s3 
14
 https://github.com/pegasus-isi/pegasus/blob/master/bin/pegasus-transfer 
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>>> import boto 
>>> conn = boto.connect_s3() 
>>> bucket = conn.create_bucket('mybucket') 
→ generates an error due to a non-unique bucket name: 
Traceback (most recent call last): 
 File "<stdin>", line 1, in <module> 
 File "/Library/Python/2.7/site-packages/boto-2.0-
py2.7.egg/boto/s3/connection.py", line 391, in create_bucket 
 response.status, response.reason, body) 
boto.exception.S3CreateError: S3CreateError: 409 Conflict 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?> 
<Error><Code>BucketAlreadyExists</Code><Message>The requested bucket 
name is not available. The bucket namespace is shared by all users of 
the system. Please select a different name and try 
again.</Message><BucketName>mybucket</BucketName><RequestId>31F6685035
DA2912</RequestId><HostId>jEA7ksQ5k+woEQN7z65i6iISvS9BznPVyqF+TAqJ9fpF
f8kjAIJpObhMaEJUgAk1</HostId></Error> 
>>> 
>>> bucket = conn.create_bucket('rwh-bucket') 
>>> from boto.s3.key import Key 
>>> k=Key(bucket) 
>>> k.key='foobar' 
>>> k.set_contents_from_string("This is Randy's test of S3") 
>>> 
 
Exit the Python interpreter, re-start, and verify we can retrieve the contents of what we just put 
in the bucket: 
 
Python 2.7.1 (r271:86832, Jun 16 2011, 16:59:05) 
[GCC 4.2.1 (Based on Apple Inc. build 5658) (LLVM build 2335.15.00)] 
on darwin 
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information. 
>>> import boto 
>>> c = boto.connect_s3() 
>>> b=c.create_bucket('rwh-bucket') 
>>> from boto.s3.key import Key 
>>> k=Key(b) 
>>> k.key='foobar' 
>>> k.get_contents_as_string() 
"This is Randy's test of S3" 
 
To copy the contents of a file and set access controls: 
key.set_contents_from_filename('/home/fred/stuff.dat') 
b.set_acl('public-read', ‘foobar’)C 
